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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ROBERT A. TI-IOMPSON,
HERBERT RICHEY and
MA RIB RICHEY, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
11905

KYLE H. BREWSTER and
MONARCH LOAN COMPANY, INC.,
A Utah Corporation,
Defendants and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action is brought by the plaintiffs to quiet
title. The case against the Monarch Loan Company
Inc. , was dismissed.
The defendant Brewster denies the right of the plaintiffs, alleges that the right
to possession is in himself. and by way of counterclaim seeks to regain possession of the property
with damages.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The issues were found in favor of the plaintiffs,
and the defendant Brewster, hereinafter referred to
as the defendant , was denied relief on his counterclaim.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgement and
an order remanding the case for retrial.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
"The
property
consists of thirteen duplexes
built on
land
held
on
a
longterm government lease with the furniture and
fixtures and is located in Tooele County.
The
plaintiffs sold the same to the defendant under a uni form real estate contract."(R-9, 10 and 17. The quotation is taken from page 1 of the court's memorandum decision of which there are three copies in the
record.)
The contract was executed on the 27th day of September, 1967,
with a recited consideration of
$130,000.00 , of which $20, 100.00 was paid down
and the balance at $900. 00 a month with 1/ 12 of
the taxes, insurance, etc. , amounting to an additional $300.00, or a total of $1, 200.00 a month.
One only notice of intention to declare a forfeiture was given on the 4th day of September,
1968 (Exhibit 5-P)
which alleged a default of
$.1., 195. 75 and allowed five days within which to pay
the amount of the default.
Some confusion exists in the record as to
whether or not there was in fact a default at the
time, growing out of the fact that the defendant
was to have received a $4, 100. 00 credit on the
contract growing out of a former "self-help"seizure of the same property by the plaintiffs, which
the defendant claims was never received, except
as a bookkeeping item, (Exhibit P-2 and Tr,-71-3)
and the further fact that the defendant claims
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to have sent the payments in within the grace
period (Tr-69-12 and 79-17).
Following that notice the plaintiff served by
registered mail a notice to defendant declaring
forfeiture, and by its terms allowing five days
to surrender premises or in the event of "your
failure to do so, legal proceedings will be instigated against you to recover possession of the said
property." (Exhibit P-4 and P-6 and Tr 51-1) This
notice was postmarked September 16, 1968. However, without waiting five days,
the plaintiff
Robert A . Thompson,
"went out there" and
"physically took over the property," (Tr 9-8) with
the money, $200. 00 rent, which had been collected by the defendant's caretaker and all (Tr 14-18).
On the 6th day of December, 1968, the defendant filed a petition in bankruptcy Case Number
B-1324-68, under the provisions of Chapter 13 of
the Act and set out in bis schedules and his plan
the property and the contract sued upon (R-14).
This action was commenced by the filing of a
complaint on the 3rd day of April, 1969 (R-1).
On the 17th day of June, 1969, the defendant
filed his affidavit and motion to stay proceedings,
immediately prior to the time set for the commencement of the trial, and his motion to stay
was denied (Rll, 12, 13 and 14, and Tr-2 and 3).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY IN THE LIGHT OF HIS
THEN PENDING BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS.
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At the time the plainti:ffs filed their complaint
in the above entitled matter, on the 3rd of April,

1969 (R-1), the affairs of the defendant were and
ever since the said time have been and now are
administered by the bankruptcy court under the provisions of Chapter 13, which vests in the Federal
Court the exclusive jurisdiction of the defendant,
his property and his earnings:
"Title 11 Sec. 1011 (U. S. C. A . at page 717). Exclus ive jurisdiction of debtor, property and earnings.
Where not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Chapter. the Court in which the petition is filed
shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have ex elusive jurisdiction of the debtor and his property,
wherever located. and of his earnings and wages
during the period of consummation of the plan."
Colliers 14th edition Vol.IO on Bankruptcy page 74
paragraph 23. 01 and page 79 paragraph 23. 05.

The following language is from the decision in
the case of Matter of Forgay, 140 Fed. Sup. 473.
granting a permanent injunction against the enforcement of a Utah state default judgement, decided
April 4, 1966, from pages 477 and 480 respectively:
"Neither the bankrupt nor his lawyer is familiar
with this field of law and both are led into the false
security of a belief that while the matter is pend ing, the bankrupt court has exclusive charge of it.
This is shown by the fact that almost always these
cases arise out of defaults in the state court action.
Enforcement of the default judgement penalizes the
bankrupt for having faith in the dignity and power
of the federal court ...
"Strong additional reasons support our view. The
Act itself provides that it shall be administered by
the federal courts. Every orderly and needful rem edy and proceeding are provided in the Act. Protection to the debtor, creditor and the public are
provided. The division of judicial administration
weakens the Act and confuses its administration.
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With orderly procedure and jurisdiction available.
it can be relied upon by the worthy debtor to protect him against embarrassment, surprising and
harrassing proceedings and the expense of a multiplicity of unnecessary suits. The public and the
crooitor are protected against the discharge of the
unworthy debtor."

POINT II

TI-IE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING A FORFEITURE OF TI-IE RIGHTS OF TI-IE DEFENDANT IN
TI-IE CONTRACT AND IN TI-IE PROPERTY.

"The pertinent issue is whether the forfeiture
of all past payments on the premises as provided
in the contract unconscionably burdened defendant",
is the language of the Court in approaching a similar question in the case of Weyher v. Peterson,
16 U 2nd 278 at 279, 399 P 2nd 438 at 439.
"In Christy v. Guild Supra, we recognized the
principle that acceptance of delinquent payments
may well result in a waiver of the ordinary "time
is of the essence" clause since by such conduct
the vendor has led the vendee into the belief that
the vendor will contiirue to waive the strict performance of the contract." Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 U 2nd
124 at 129, 270 P 2nd 442 at 445. This decision
also points out the rule from Section 300 of Restatment of Contracts, with reference to the effect of
"acceptance of defective performance" that "Tirls
is a question the answer to which depends on the
differing facts of each case. "

The contract in this case recites a down payment of $20, 100. 00 cash (Rl).
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The vendors, the plaintiffs, permitted the vend ee, the defendant, to make irregular payments during the whole time. (Tr 12-16, 27-6,
page 3 1st
paragraph of Court Ruling).
The plaintiffs, in violation of their settlement
agreement to "credit Mr. Brewster with a total of
$4, 100. 00 which shall be applied toward the unpaid
balance owing on the contract" (Exhibit P-2), "took
out what we had to spend on the property for main tenance and big stoves, refrigerators or whatever
we needed to buy." (Tr 28-1 also 12-8).
On the 23rd of August,, 1968, the date of the
plaintiff's default notice which was served on the
4th day of September,
claiming a default of
$1, 195. 75, there was no default at all according to
the agreement of the parties (exhibit P-2). There
was a missapplication of funds by the plaintiffs.
There was one only notice of default (Exhibit
5-P) which, since payments had been irregularly
received was not sufficient.
Finally there was an unlawful and improper
taking of the property together with the books and
effects of the defendant, and the "very small a mount (of money)--maybe two hundred and some
dollars or-- I don't think over three hundred" (Tr
14-18).
This two hundred and some dollars seems to
have been over-looked by the Court and it is referred to here merely as an evidence of the sort of
"sharp practice" that Judge Worthen seems to have
been referring to in the Peck v. Judd case 7 U 2nd
421 at page 428, 326 P 2nd 712 at 717, which has
been cited with approval in Carlson v. Hamilton
8 U 2nd 272 at 275, 332 P 2nd 989 at page 991 and
also Weyher V. Peterson referred to above, at
page 279 Utah, 439 Pacific:
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"Courts of equity shall not interfere except when
sharp practice or most unconscionable results are
to be prevented . ''

POINT III
TI-IE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND DAMAGES FOR TI-IE DEFENDANT.

The Court on Page 5 of its memorandum decision finds that "the re-entry of plaiDtiffs was in
violation of Section 2 of 78-36-2" but fails to award damages, which seems to be inconsistent
with the holding of the well reasoned case of Freeway Park Building Inc. , v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 22 U 2nd 266 at page 271, 451 P 2nd
778 at page 782:
" ... There is no question under Utah cases that a
violation of the duty set by statute gives rise to an
action for damages. not in an action under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute but as a separate
tort ... "

CONCLUSION
Since, as stated in the Kohler v. Lundberg
case back in 1919, 54 U 339 at 343, 180 P 590 at
page 594:
"Courts of equity are loath to enforce a forfeiture,
especially when a refusal to do so. as in this case,
gives to all parties to the agreement every right
to which they are entitled.
and thus works no
hardship upon anyone.
The right of forfeitur""
once waived cannot be recalled. "

8
and since a forfeiture in this case would unconscionably burden the defendant and since a trial is
required to determine the defendant's damage, the
above case should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,
Horace J. Knowlton
214 Tenth Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Attorney for Appellant

